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THE INS AND OUTS OF MODERN PORTS:
RETHINKING CONTAINER SECURITY
Jennifer L. North*
This paper specifically addresses those measures taken since
September 11, 2001, that deal directly with the security of our cargo
containers, the largest segment of the international supply chain. Part
One provides a backdrop for legislation of trade and port security. Part
Two discusses the law mandating various measures for cargo security.
Part Three addresses differences between the industry experts and
Congress on how best to tackle security issues relating to containers.
The primary focus of this paper deals with the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, which stands apart from the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,' but remains an integral
part of maritime security. The SAFE Port Ace brought together several
initiatives already in practice, and some other seemingly unrelated
legislation.3 The three initiatives discussed in this paper are the
Container Security Initiative, 4 Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism, 5 and the much discussed 100 percent scanning amendment

* Professor of Legal Writing, Charleston School of Law; LL.M., Tulane
Law School; J.D., Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. The author
wishes to express her appreciation to the University of South Carolina School
of Law, and the student editors, in particular Suzanne White, of the South
Carolina Journal of International Law & Business, for their invitation to the
participate in this symposium, and their generous support throughout the
development of this article.
1 Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2006).
2 Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006). The Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 codified several measures relating to
port security: Transportation Worker Identity Cards (TWIC); interagency
operational center for port security; port security grant program; Container
Security Initiative; foreign port assessments; Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism; Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; funds for Integrated
Deepwater System Program - US Coast Guard modernization program; and
implemented regulations for online gambling.
3 The Unlawful Internet Gambling regulation was added at the I th
hour.
4 6 U.S.C. § 945 (2006).
5 6 U.S.C. § 961-73.
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to the SAFE Ports Act, found in the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.6
I. THE BACKDROP FOR LEGISLATION OF TRADE AND PORT
SECURITY
The expanse of global trade is woven into the history and the
future of nations. The maritime industry is the primary system in which
trade traverses the world, and the container is the means by which 95
percent of all goods travel. Although the shipping container has been
utilized for arguably 200 years, it was not until the 1950s when the U.S.
Army began using containers to ship supplies that containers started to
become the standard for transporting goods in numerous industries.8
Today, container sizes are standardized to allow for the greatest
flexibility in shipping, and ships are special built to carry several
thousand containers.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), 9 a specialized
agency of the United Nations, is considered to be the foremost
international gatekeeper for maritime law, despite having no sovereign
authority. Contracting Parties, however, as signatories to various
conventions, are generally required to comply.' Failure to comply can

6

Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1701, 121 Stat. 266, 489 (2007).

7 See Veronique de Rugy, Is Port Security Spending Making Us

Safer?3 (Am. Enterprise Inst. of Pub. Pol'y Research, Working Paper
No. 115,(2005).
8 Container History, (2006), http://www.globalsecurity.rog/military/
systems/container-history.htm (last visited April 14, 2009);
See generally
MARC LEVINSON, THE Box: How THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD

SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER, (2006) (detailing the history of
the modem shipping container).
9 International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org (last visited
Feb. 24, 2009). Throughout its 61 years of existence, the IMO has promulgated
international conventions and protocols covering maritime safety and security,
prevention and reduction of pollution, preparedness for and response to
maritime accidents and other issues including the facilitation of maritime traffic
and salvage. IMO: 50 years, 50 treaties, http://imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp
?topicid=1709&doc id=9076 (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
10 There are 148 Contracting Parties to SOLAS (International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea). The International Ship and Port
Security Code (ISPS) is an amendment to SOLAS, and as such compliance is
mandated. FAQ on ISPS Code and maritime security, http://www.imo.
org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic id=897 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). In
contrast, there are 167 member states in the IMO. IMO: 50 years, 50 treaties,
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result in a range of consequences. 1" The IMO was created in response
to the Titanic disaster, and through time, it has continued to issue
guidelines about those things most concerning the maritime industry,
with the main objective to keep commerce flowing.
A timely and recent example of internationally driven and
domestically implemented guidelines is the International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code (ISPS), which was promulgated in direct
response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.2 Although the
attacks did not come via a maritime pathway, it was clear that in
looking at vulnerable entry points, most ports could be a favored
target. 13 The ISPS lays out minimum security requirements for ships
and ports with the main objectives being to detect security threats and
implement security measures; to establish roles and responsibilities for
entities involved in maritime security; to collate and promulgate
security related information; and to provide a methodology for security
assessments that will aid in4developing plans and procedures to respond
to various security threats.'
The extent of maritime trade cannot be underestimated. United
States ports move 99.4 percent of overseas trade by volume, and 64.1

http://imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topicid=1709&doc-id=9076 (last visited
Feb. 24, 2009).
"Possible
sanctions are enforced through member state action:
"contracting governments should direct those ships flying their flag [which are
not in compliance] to immediately discontinue operations until they have been
issued the required certificate." FAQ on ISPS Code and maritime security,
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic-id=897 (last visited Feb.
25, 2009). They may also detain a ship in port that does not have the required
certificate, expel the ship, refuse entry to the ship, or curtail the operations of
the ship. In sum "[t]he measures which are in place have been designed in such
a way to ensure that those ships which do not have certificates find themselves
out of the market in the shortest possible time." Id. Further, owners may direct
their ships not to call at ports that are not in compliance, as the ships may
encounter problems at subsequent ports of call. Id. This is similar to the idea
behind the benefits to being a CSI partner discussed later in this article.
12 The ISPS is a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security
of ships and port facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats to
ships and port facilities in the wake of 9/11 attacks in the United States. FAQ
on ISPS Code and maritime security, http://www.imo.org/ Newsroom/
mainframe.asp?topic id=897 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
13 See de Rugy, supra note 7, at 11.
14 FAQ on ISPS Code, supra note 12 ("the whole idea of the ISPS Code
is to reduce the vulnerability of the industry to attack thus countering the threat
and reducing the risk.")
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per cent by value, according to the U.S. Census bureau." This equates
to approximately 11 million containers annually that are offloaded in
United States ports. 16 Projections vary, but the Department of
Transportation estimates that total freight moved through United States
Ports will increase by at least 50 percent by the year 2020 (as compared
to 2001), and international container traffic will more than double.
Currently worldwide container traffic is estimated to be at 100 million
containers annually. 7 With the current volume of traffic and the
projected numbers, there is no doubt that infrastructure will need
additional expansion, and processing technologies will need to continue
development, both of which will aid in the efficiency and safety of the
maritime industry. 18 The disruption of the supply chain is of paramount
concern to the industry. Aside from the threat of terrorism, the industry
is also concerned about regional conflicts, natural disasters, organized
crime, changes in political administration, funding shifts, and
unforeseen technological developments. 19
Disruptions are costly, with it being estimated that a two day
closure of a port would cost $58 billion, while a detonation of a nuclear
device could cause up to $1 trillion dollars in damage. There is
potential that this type of catastrophe could plunge a nation, or the
world, into a dangerous economic downturn.2 °
II. U.S. MARITIME SECURITY LAW
The United States has been a leader in evaluating and
implementing port security measures and has passed initial legislation
addressing the recognized concerns. The Maritime Transportation and
Security Act (MTSA), passed before the ISPS, but paralleling it,
15

U.S. Public Port Facts (July 2008), http://www.aapa-ports.org/files/

PDFs/facts.pdf.
16 Recently CBP Commissioner testified that 32,000 containers arrive
daily. Cargo and Container Security: Before the Subcomm. on Homeland Sec.
of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 11 th Cong. (2009) (statement of Jayson
Ahem, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs & Border Protection) availableat
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1238603858 77.shtm..
17 Container Security Initiative Strategic Plan, http://www.cbp.gov
/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo-security/csi/csi-strategic-plan.ctt/csi-strategic-p
lan.pdf.
18 Id.
19 Id.

20 See generally Container Security, "Expansion of Key Customs
Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors," July
2003, GAO-03-770, U.S. GAO, 8.
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2
requires that security be evaluated at port facilities and on vessels. 1
Once evaluated, vessel owners and port managers are expected to
implement plans specific to their responsibilities in order to improve
overall security in the maritime industry. Among the interests noted in
the MTSA are generally protecting ports and waterways from terrorist
attacks. Specifically the Act lists areas for ports to consider an
evaluation such as conducting vulnerability assessments, developing
security plans and screening procedures for cargo, establishing security
patrols and delineating restricted areas, implementing personal
identification procedures, access control measures, and installing
surveillance equipment where appropriate. 22

The SAFE Port Act of 2006 overlaps to some extent the
directives of the MTSA when it addresses the overall security of the
international supply chain. 23 The Act advocates a multi-agency
approach to develop and implement security standards in the chain,
taking into account proposed and established practices of foreign
governments and international organizations. 24 Considerations for
developing these programs include describing the roles,
responsibilities, and authorities who are part of the security chain and
identifying gaps, and unnecessary overlaps that should be eliminated.25
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is instructed to make
recommendations regarding legislation and regulations, and potential
organizational changes to improve security. 26 Resources available and
cost-benefits need to be considered as well as looking for additional
voluntary measures that might enhance security.
Recognizing that additional regulations and legislative
requirements can be onerous to the small and medium sized companies,
Congress makes reference to considering the effect these measures will
have on these companies, adding that a process for sharing intelligence
and other information is desirable. 2 Finally, when preventative
measures fail, ports should have prudent responses and protocols in

21 Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2006).
22 Id.
23 6 U.S.C. § 941(b)(12). "International Supply Chain" means the end-

to-end process for shipping goods to or from the United States beginning at the
point of origin (including manufacturer, supplier, or vendor) through a point of
distribution to the destination. 6 U.S.C. § 901(10).
24 6 U.S.C. § 941(c).
25 6 U.S.C. § 941(b)
26 id.
27 6 U.S.C. §941(b)(8)
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place to deal with events affecting the supply chain, and to provide for
expeditious resumption in the flow of trade.28
A. CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE

The Container Security Initiative has been in place since January,
2002, just a few short months following September 11, 2001. It was
implemented by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which functions
now as part of the Department of Homeland Security. 29 Aside from one
notable addition, the entire initiative laid out by CBP was adopted and
codified by the SAFE Ports Act.
The SAFE Ports Act, as it relates to container security, provides
for various inspections, screening, and scanning measures to be under
taken both at U.S. and foreign ports. 30 Through the Automated
Targeting System (ATS) all information about cargo is reviewed and
given a risk evaluation; if deemed to be high-risk it will be subject to
the various inspection procedures. 3 ' The ATS is able to provide real
time data to inspectors at ports who may request additional scrutiny for
these high-risk containers. This may include intrusive inspections,
where containers are opened and visually inspected, but this is rare.

28 6 U.S.C. §941(b)(10)

29 U.S. Custom and Border Protection, Container Security Initiative,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/factsheets/tradesecurity/csi.xml (last
visited Apr. 30, 2009).
'o 6 U.S.C. § 945. "Examination" means an inspection of cargo to
detect the presence of misdeclared, restricted, or prohibited items that utilizes
nonintrusive imaging and detection technology. 6 U.S.C. § 901(8).
"Inspection" means the comprehensive process used by the CBP to assess
goods entering the United States to appraise them for duty purposes, to detect
the presence of restricted or prohibited items, and to ensure compliance with all
applicable laws; the process may include screening, conducting an
examination, or conducting a search. 6 U.S.C. § 901(9). "Scan" means to utilize
nonintrusive imaging equipment, radiation detection equipment, or both, to
capture data, including images of a container. 6 U.S.C. § 901(12). "Screen"
means a visual or automated review of information about goods, including a
manifest or entry documentation accompanying a shipment being imported into
the United States, to determine the presence of misdeclared, restricted, or
prohibited items and assess the level of threat posed by such cargo. 6 U.S.C. §
901(13). "Search" means an intrusive examination in which a container is
opened and its contents are devanned and visually inspected for the presence of
misdeclared, restricted, or prohibited items. 6 U.S.C. § 901(14).
31 6 U.S.C. § 943.
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Usually containers are scanned using x-rays or gamma ray
devices that
32
aim to detect dangerous radioactive and nuclear materials.
As is clear, cooperation with foreign governments is essential to
ensuring port security. To date, the CBP has been instrumental in
3
partnering with 58 foreign ports to combat known security threats.
Through these ports travel 85 percent of the trade entering the United
States by vessel. Currently, the CBP is able to "pre-screen" 86 percent
of all containers exiting these ports, with a goal to screen 100 percent.
The value of the "pre-screening" is that where high-risk factors are
indentified, those containers are able to be flagged for further scrutiny.
The Implementing the Recommendations of 9/11 Act of 2007
amended an already controversial feature of the SAFE Ports Act. Under
the SAFE Ports Act, Congress mandated 100 percent screening of
cargo containers and 100 percent scanning of high-risk containers
originating outside the United States. 34 These containers would be
screened and scanned (as appropriate) before leaving a U.S. facility. 5
In the SAFE Ports Act, Congress anticipated full implementation of
scanning sometime in the future, but the 9/11 Act firmly established
July 1, 2012, as the date by which all containers shall be scanned.36
This provision is one that, coincidentally, was never a goal of CBP
when implementing the Container Security Initiative in 2002. 37
Furthermore, in the 9/11 Act, Congress explicitly stated: "A
container that was loaded on a vessel in a foreign port shall not enter

32

6 U.S.C. § 592.

33 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Container Security Fact Sheet

(Oct. 2, 2007), http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo security/csi/
csi fact sheet.ctt/csi fact sheet.doc.
34 6 U.S.C. § 982.
35 The SAFE Port Act also created an office for Domestic Nuclear
Detection at 6 U.S.C. § 591. Part of the mission of this office would be to scan
for radiation all containers entering the United States through the 22 ports
which have the greatest volume of entering containers shall be scanned for
radiation. 6 U.S.C. § 921(a). By December 31, 2008 this program was
mandated to expand to all U.S. ports of entry. 6 U.S.C § 921(h).
36 6 U.S.C. 982(b)(2). Full scale implementation was contemplated at
the time of the passage of the SAFE Ports Act, but several mitigating factors
would allow for a delay in implementation: high false alarm rates; deployment
issues at foreign ports; an inability to integrate with existing systems; an overly
detrimental impact on the flow of cargo and trade capacity; and an inability to
provide automated notification of questionable or high risk cargo as a trigger
for further inspection. 6 U.S.C. § 982(b)(4).
37 6 U.S.C. 982(b)(2).
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the United States (either directly or via a foreign port) unless the
container was scanned by nonintrusive imaging equipment and
radiation detection equipment at a foreign port before it was loaded on
a vessel. 3 s
Other provisions in the SAFE Ports Act followed closely the
guidelines the CBP already had in place under the Container Security
Initiative. In fact the name CSI transferred into the legislation, where
§945 enumerates the actions DHS must take with regard to the
movement of containers. 39 Under §945, the Department shall identify
and examine or search containers in a foreign port that are bound for
the United States. 40 The Department/CBP can accomplish this task by
directly inspecting the container or by requesting
the host port to
4
conduct the inspection, while CBP observes. '
Initially the participating ports were determined via the Secretary
through an assessment of "the level of risk for the potential for
compromise of containers by terrorists.

' 42

Other factors considered

were the volume of cargo being imported to the United States through
the foreign seaport, the results of Coast Guard assessments conducted
under 46 U.S.C. § 70108, and the commitment of the foreign
government to cooperating with the United States to share critical data,
risk management information, and maintaining programs to ensure
employee integrity.43 The Secretary may also consider the potential for
validation of security practices at the foreign seaport.44

38

Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1701, 121 Stat. 266, 489 (2007) (amending 6

U.S.C. § 982(b)). Here the deadline to scan can also be delayed if at least two
of the following circumstances exist: systems to scan containers are not
available for purchase and installation; systems do not have a sufficiently low
false alarm rate for use in the supply chain; systems cannot be purchases,
deployed, or operated at ports overseas, including if applicable, because a port
does not have the physical characteristics to install such a system; systems
cannot be integrated, as necessary with existing systems; use of systems that
are available to scan containers will significantly impact trade and the flow of
cargo; systems do not adequately provide an automated notification of
questionable or high risk cargo as a trigger for further inspection by
appropriately trained personnel. Id.
'96 U.S.C. § 945.
40 id.
41 id.
6 U.S.C. § 945(b)(1).
4' 6 U.S.C. § 945(b)(2-4)
44 6 U.S.C. § 945(b)(5).
42
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When foreign ports sign on to be partners in CSI, they must meet
certain requirements. The partnership is truly mutual in that the
counterparts of the CBP are invited to station their own customs agents
in United States ports to observe inspections/scanning procedures. 4 For
overseas inspections, the CBP establishes procedures for the use of
nonintrusive nuclear and radiological detective systems. The cost of
this equipment, though expensive, is expected to be borne by the
foreign host. CBP/CSI teams also continually monitor the inspection
techniques, procedures, and technologies used at foreign ports to ensure
these ports are in compliance with their CSI partnership agreement.46
The Secretary of Homeland Security must consult with the Secretary of
Energy in establishing the technical capability criteria and the standard
operating procedures that pertain to the detection of radiation in order
to promote consistency at foreign ports.47
The Secretary is authorized to issue "do not load" orders, via
48
existing authorities, in order to prevent the loading of high-risk cargo.
The designation of "high-risk" may be reassessed when a scan of the
cargo with nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection
produces no anomalies, if there has been a satisfactory search of the
cargo, or if new information has been received to show that the cargo is
safe.49
B. CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is
the second initiative complementing CSI that was codified under SAFE
Ports Act. 50 The initiative, also begun in 2002, expands the idea of
"moving back the borders" even beyond that of what CSI does. In CTPAT, importers, brokers, forwarders, air, sea, land carriers, contract
logistics providers, and other entities in the international supply chain
voluntarily enter into partnership with the DHS where they agree to
provide additional information regarding the contents of their
shipments. 51 While CSI is primarily concerned with the riskiness of the
cargo, C-TPAT has a dual purpose to both obtain more information
regarding the shipment so risk evaluations can be made, and also to
keep the supply chain running as efficiently as possible. When eligible
45See Container Security Initiative Fact Sheet, supra note 33.
6 U.S.C. § 945(e)(1)(c).
4' 6 U.S.C. § 945(e)(l)(d).
46

48

6 U.S.C. § 945(k)(1).

4'6 U.S.C. § 945(k)(1)(a-c).

'06 U.S.C. § 961-973.
5'6 U.S.C. § 962.
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entities partner under C-TPAT, they receive benefits by meeting or
exceeding the program requirements. 52 The participants receive Tier 1,
2, or 3 status, and the various benefits that go along with that
designation. 3
In order to receive any beneficial status designation all entities
must meet minimum requirements. 4 The applicants must demonstrate
that they have a history of moving cargo in the international supply
chain. 55 They further have to show an assessment of its supply chain by
reviewing its own business partner requirements, container security,
physical security and access controls, personnel security, procedural
security, security training and threat awareness, and information
technology security. 6 Finally, if determined as necessary by CBP, the
entity must implement and maintain
additional security measures
57
meeting the criteria of the DHS.
Once the minimum requirements have been met, entities may
apply for validation in three phases. Tier I status will include a
background investigation and extensive documentation review by
CBP. 58 The benefits to the Tier 1 status allow a reduction in the risk
score assigned by ATS. 59 Tier 2 status involves those satisfactory Tier
I participants whose security practices are assessed onsite by the
Department. 60 This assessment conducted at foreign locations should be
completed within one year of Tier 1 validation. 61 Tier 2 benefits
include reduced risk scores in ATS, reduced examinations of cargo, and
priority searches of cargo.62 Tier 3 participants receive additional
benefits beyond Tier 2 status. 3 Tier 3 participants are those who have
demonstrated a sustained commitment to maintaining satisfactory
security measures exceeding those of the Tier 2 entity. Tier 3 status is
granted when participants are in compliance with any additional
52

6 U.S.C. § 961(a) (DHS "is authorized to establish a voluntary

government private sector program ... to strengthen and improve the overall
security ... and to facilitate the movement of secure cargo ... by providing
benefits to participants meeting or exceeding the program requirements").
13 6 U.S.C. §§ 964-966.
14 6 U.S.C. § 963.

" 6 U.S.C. § 963(1)

56 6 U.S.C. § 963(2)(A-G)
17 6 U.S.C. § 963(3-4)
58 6 U.S.C. § 964(b)
'9 6 U.S.C. § 964(a).

60 6 U.S.C. § 965.

61 6 U.S.C. § 965(a).
62 6 U.S.C. § 965(b).
63 6 U.S.C. § 966.
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guidelines set out by the Secretary, to include submission of additional
information regarding cargo prior to loading, and utilization of
container security devices, technologies, policies and practices that
meet the DHS standards and criteria for security. 64 Incentives to
become Tier 3 participants include expedited release of a cargo in
destination ports within the US during all threat levels, further
reduction in examinations of cargo, further reduction in the risk score
assigned pursuant to ATS, and inclusion in joint incident management
exercises.65
All C-TPAT participants are subject to reevaluation and will
suffer consequences if found not be in compliance. 66 An example of
noncompliance that will suspend or expel a participant is providing
false or misleading information during the validation process. 6 7 CBP is
authorized to publish the names of those suspended or expelled entities
in the Federal Register, and participants may appeal adverse decisions
within 90 days. 68 Each participant shall be revalidated not less than
every four years 69 and importers of non-containerized cargoes are also
eligible to participate in C-TPAT.7 °
A similar benefit of priority is bestowed on vessels that have
certain other certifications under the SAFE Act. During a maritime
security incident vessels with an approved security plan or valid
international ship security certificate, and manned by approved
individuals in accordance with 46 U.S.C. §70105(b)(2)(B) and that is
operated by validated participants in C-TPAT will get priority for
inspection and clearance of its cargo. 7'
Cargo may also be given priority where it is entering a port
directly from a foreign seaport designated under the CSI, is from the
supply chain of a validated C-TPAT participant, or if it has undergone a
nuclear, radiological detection scan, an x-ray density, or other imaging
scan, and a system to positively identify the container at the last port of
departure prior to arrival
72 in the US, and that data has been evaluated
and analyzed by CBP.
64

65
66
67
68
69
70

71
72

6 U.S.C.
6 U.S.C.
6 U.S.C.
6 U.S.C.
6 U.S.C.
6 U.S.C.
6 U.S.C.
6 U.S.C.
6 U.S.C.

§ 966(b)
§ 966(c).
§ 967.
§ 967(b).
§ 967(c).
§ 969.
§ 970.
§ 942(b).
§ 942(c).
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111. SUPPORTERS AND DETRACTORS
Despite the devastation that could be caused by the explosion of
a nuclear device, the 100 percent scanning provision has been
controversial for several reasons. When one considers the amount of
individual containers that must be scanned prior to leaving a foreign
port, the task is enormous, and near impossible.73 Further, when
evaluating the mandate under a cost benefit analysis, experts note that,
though catastrophic, the actual risk of this scenario is quite low--so low
that the amount expended on this program exceeds the benefit received.
A third factor that is sometimes noted is that the actual scanning
equipment is not reliable where nuclear material has been shielded, and
the machines can produce numerous false positive results.
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has conducted
nonpartisan reviews of the International Supply Chain and the
Container Security Initiative, and noted both positive and negative
aspects.74 The leaders of CBP and the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) recently testified before Congress reporting on whether
goals laid out in the SAFE Ports Act and the 9/11 Act have been met. 75
Department officials are generally upbeat about the progress that has
been made in developing international partnerships and being viewed
as the leader in the world for supply chain security. 76 The underlying
approach heralded by CBP is a risk management model.77
CBP is collecting more, and improved, advance information on
cargo, which has allowed for better risk assessments via the ATS
before cargo arrives in the United States. 78 Continuing with the multi73 This also implicates huge cost and personnel requirements.
74 See generally GAO, Maritime Security: The SAFE Ports Act: Status

and Implementation One Year Later, GAO-08-126T (2007); GAO, Supply
Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have
Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are
Needed, GAO-08-187 (2008).
75 Cargo and Container Security: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Homeland Security of the House Committee on Appropriations, 11 th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Jayson Ahem, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs &
Border Protection), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/
testimony_123860385877.shtm.
76 Id.

77 Id. Risk management as used here indicates that choices must be
made under both cost benefit ideas as well as keeping in mind the feeling that
no gap can be left in the entire system, a potentially impossible task.
78 Id. The CBP Importer Security Filing (also known as 10+2) includes
manufacturer (or supplier) name and address, seller (or owner) name and

2009]

THE INS AND OUTS OF MODERN PORTS
RETHINKING CONTAINER SECURITY

203

layered approach favored by the Department, the C-TPAT program has
allowed the United States to leverage security where CBP has limited
regulatory power. 79 Additionally, C-TPAT continues to be a strong
incentive for companies: CBP projects that 3,200 validations will be
requested during fiscal year 2009 for both certification and
revalidations 8s
Further, CBP reports that it is able to review 100 percent of all
manifests under the CSI program. 8 ' CBP has partnered with 32
countries and has a presence at 58 ports world-wide. Through these
ports, 86 percent of all containerized cargo passes to the United
States.8 2 Ninety-five percent of examinations requested were
performed
8 3
by the host countries amounting to 74,000 examinations.
CBP is less enthusiastic about the Secure Freight Initiative,
specifically in regard to the 100% scanning requirement.84 While there
are pilot projects in place to measure the effectiveness of the program,
the CBP admitted that attempting to scan 11.3 million containers
presents "significant,
operational,
technical,
and diplomatic

address, buyer (or owner) name and address, ship to name and address,
container stuffing location, consolidator (Stuffer) name and address, importer
or record number/foreign trade zone applicant identification number, consignee
number(s), country of origin, and Commodity Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States number. In addition, two more data elements are provided by
the carriers: the Vessel Stow Plan and Container Status Messaging. Id.
79 Asking for stricter compliance encourages companies to provide
additional information, where the United States has no power to legislate this
compliance outside the United States..
soAhem, supra note 75.

83

Id.
id.
id.

84

The Secure Freight Initiative is laid out in the SAFE Ports Act at 6

81
82

U.S.C. § 981 and § 981(a) (DHS shall designate three foreign seaports for the
establishment of pilot integrated scanning systems that couple nonintrusive
imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment, and ports should be
distinct with unique features and differing levels of trade volume). The pilot
system will: scan all containers destined for the U.S. that are loaded in such
ports; electronically transmit the images and information to US personnel for
evaluation and analysis; resolve every radiation alarm according to established
Department procedures; utilize the information to enhance the ATS; store the
information for later retrieval and analysis; and may provide automated
notification of questionable or high risk cargo as a trigger for further inspection
by appropriately trained personnel.
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challenges. 85 The Commissioner asserted that limited scanning is
possible but is currently limited to gate traffic as there is no technology
available that would allow scanning in transshipped containers.86 This
scanning is in addition to the scanning that is done for all arriving sea
containers prior to release at domestic ports. In the United States,
scanning equipment is available at 87 seaports for a total of 409
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs). Approximately 98% of all arriving
sea-borne containers pass through these entry points. Eighty-three more
RPMs will be deployed by the end of fiscal year 2009.87
Not to neglect additional security measures, the Commissioner
addressed the SAFE Ports Act reference to container security standards
and devices, 88 indicating that the procurement of such devices had not
yet been successful.
The Commissioner's recent testimony is supported by that of the
Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO),
the agency tasked with reducing the risk of radiological and nuclear

85

Ahem, supra note 75. Challenges listed include sustainability of the

scanning equipment in extreme weather conditions and certain port
environments; varying and significant costs of transferring the data back to the
United States in real-time; re-configuring port layouts to accommodate the
equipment without affecting port efficiency and getting permission of host
governments; developing local response protocols for adjudicating alarms;
addressing health and safety concerns of host governments and local trucking
and labor unions; identifying who will incur the costs for operating and
maintaining scanning equipment; acquiring necessary trade data prior to
processing containers through the SFI system; addressing privacy concerns in
regards to scanning the data; concluding agreements with partnering nations
and terminal operators to document roles and responsibilities regarding issues
such as ownership, operation, and maintenance of the equipment, sharing of
information, and import duty and tax considerations; staffing implications of
both the foreign customs service and terminal operator; licensing requirements
for the scanning technology; host government support for continuing to scan
100 percent of U.S. bound containers after the pilot ends; and potential
requirements for reciprocal scanning of U.S. exports.
86

Id.

87

Id. These measures are significant, if not all encompassing, but Ahem

describes the risk of using a maritime transportation system to deliver nuclear
or radiological device as still low. Many agree that due to handoffs, delays,
mixups, and other uncertainties throughout the supply chain, terrorists would be
reluctant to transport what would likely be their one and only weapon through
an unpredictable system. US Congress shifts away from 100 percent container
screening, http://www.shippingonline.cn/info/msg.asp?id+8894.
88 Ahern, supra note 75.
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terrorism.8 9 The Director noted that impeding the flow of legitimate
trade was a consideration as to how RN detection is implemented. 90
The technology currently being used can detect radiation, but there are
still problems because the monitors "cannot distinguish between threat
materials and naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM), such as
kitty litter and ceramic tile." 9' He assured that work is being done to
improve detection technology, as well as to reduce false alarms,
including testing of a new portal system known as the Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal (ASP). 92 He also asserted that these monitors
would be able to make intelligent determinations of threatening and
non-threatening materials, but ASP would still be unable to detect
shielded nuclear materials placed in cargo containers. 93 However, the
Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) is
currently in development to address the problem of detecting shielded
nuclear material. 94
Despite the limitations discussed before Congress, it appears that
most lawmakers disagree with the expert assessments of detection
capabilities or simply demand more protection capability than is
currently available. When the legislation was passed, Democrat leaders
attempted to dispel myths about the program that had been hindering its
approval and primarily blamed the obstacles on partisan interests.95 The
structure, however, of the legislation indicates that even the Republican
majority was cognizant of the potential problem with 100%
implementation, as evidenced by the inclusion of several means by

89

Container Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Homeland

Security of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 1 I th Cong. (2009) (statement of
Charles R. Gallaway, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office)
available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1238610092655.

The DNDO was created under the SAFE Ports Act. 6 U.S.C. § 591
(establishing an office to coordinate efforts to detect and protect against
unauthorized importation, possession, storage, transportation, development, or
use of a nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological material in
the United States, and to protect against attack using such devices or materials
against the people, territory, or interests of the United States).
90 Id.

91 Id.

These detectors are polyvinyl toluene (PVT)-based radiation

portal monitors.
92

id.

93 Id.
94 id.

95Press Release, Representative Jerrold Nadler, Myths and Realities of
100-Percent Screening (May 3, 2006), http://www/house.gov/list/press/
ny08-nadler/MythRealitiesScan050306.html.
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which DHS could extend the deadlines of full implementation. 96 Test
programs have been in place for nearly two years now, and
unfortunately, although successful on a limited scale,97 it appears that
full implementation is too burdensome without an associated
improvement in detection capabilities.
While some want to back away from the requirements, Stephen
Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that not enough funds
have been appropriated to adequately tackle the issue and that DHS has
overstated its accomplishments with regard to the efforts on cargo
security.98 A proponent of "pushing the borders out," Flynn advocates
establishing controls at the point of origin of goods, rather than using
the port as a starting place for inspection, because the CSI alone cannot
fully accomplish its mission.99 But unlike Congress, Flynn is very
critical of assuming radiation monitors can be the last line of defense.100
Nuclear materials are shielded by design;' 01 therefore reliance on
monitors that cannot detect shielded material gives a false sense of
security. This results in less attention being paid to those containers that
do in fact warrant greater scrutiny. 10 2 Flynn criticizes the honor system
used to extract data regarding the content of containers, but in the end

96

6 U.S.C. § 982.

Ahem, supra note 75.
98 Overcoming the Flaws in the U.S. Government Efforts to Improve
97

Container,Cargo, and Supply Chain Security: Hearing on Container, Cargo,
and Supply Chain Security - Challenges and Opportunities, Before the
Subcomm on Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, I I Ith
Cong. (2008) (statement of Stephen E. Flynn, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior
Fellow in National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), available
at
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/2008-04-02_FlynnImproving
ContainerSecurity.pdf.
99 Id. at 6 (stating that limitations on CSI include a hesitation to
overburden the host country with requests to inspect, flaws with the targeting
system for high risk containers result in useless inspections, and this strains
support for CS1 in the host country; the other main concern is that the flow of
trade will be interrupted, further causing tension between the U.S. and the host
port).
'0o Id. at 7.
101

Id.

102

See Jena Baker McNeil, 100 Percent Cargo ContainerScanning: A

Global Disaster (2008), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research
/Homelandsecurity/wm2047.cfm ("the more cargo scanned, the less attention
given to each piece of cargo").
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concludes that "global networks rely on trust to operate."' 10 3 He asserts
that trust will be sustained when the technologies exist to verify
detection of dangerous materials.
The IMO agrees with Flynn in that security measures must be
implemented prior to departure, at the place where the containers are
stuffed. 10 4 This requires further cooperative efforts from foreign
countries and incentives for these nations to buy-in to legislating these
new measures. This could be accomplished by contracting with
"regulated agents" that maintain satisfactory security measures and by
providing C-TPAT-like benefits to those companies who utilize such
agents. °5 Inspection of high risk cargo would still be done by control
authorities who are best able to dedicate adequate resources to
detecting dangerous contents. °6
Maritime and security trade organizations echo these concerns,
as do policy research organizations. 0 7 But these groups tend to place
more weight on a risk-management model and were recently pleased to
see that new DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano has a realistic view that
full scale implementation of 100% scanning is not possible by 2012.0 s
This recent testimony followed several studies and reviews of the

103

Flynn, supra note 98 (the objective is to continue development of

the technologies that will enable detection of nuclear materials, but urge the

government to provide incentives for private industry to develop these tools).
104 Chris Trelawny, Containerised Cargo Security - a Case for
"JoinedUp" Government, IMO News, June 7, 2006, at 12.

105Id. (cargo could be fast tracked - this is thought to provide enough
incentive for shippers to comply).
106 Id.
107 See generally Henry H. Willis & David S. Ortiz, the Rand Corp.,
EVALUATING THE SECURITY OF THE GLOBAL CONTAINERIZED SUPPLY CHAIN

(2004),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technicalreports/2004/RandTR214.pdf;
Veronique de Rugy, Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer? (Am.

Enterprise Inst. of Pub. Pol'y Res., Working Paper No.115, 2005); James Jay
Carafano, Ph.D., & Martin Edward Anderson, the Heritage FoundationTrade
Security at Sea: Setting National Priorities for Safeguarding America's
Economic Lifeline (2006), http://www/heritage.org/research/national secuirty
/bg1930.cfm; Jim Giermaski, A Different Theory for 100 Percent Container
Scanning (2007), http://www/securityinfowatch.com/ root+level/1287428;
Joseph Straw, Outlook for Container Scanning (2008), http://www.
securitymanagement.com/print/4692.
'0' US. to Miss 2012 Nuke Screening Deadline, Feb. 25, 2009.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/25/politics/100days/domesticissues/
main4828501 .html.
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scanning process that found many problems with the system and
blamed DHS of making excuses. 10 9
Policy think tanks have said that 100 percent scanning, despite
adding no additional security, could even worsen the economy and
weaken the supply chain."° Requiring scanning of low risk cargo does
not add more security to the process and in fact may alienate some
trade partners." 1
There is some indication that Congress is taking notice and may
shift its attitude on the 100 percent scan mandate. At the same House
Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee last week where the
leaders of CBP and DNDO testified, several law makers expressed
concerns that the challenges 2 and expense of implementing such a
regime outweighs any gains."1
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the debated effectiveness of the legislation,
legislators need to keep the true objective in mind, and that is the safety
and security of the nation. There are enough voices on either side of the
argument that the issue of 100 percent scanning deserves further
inquiry. If it is true that scanning cannot adequately protect against the
entry of radioactive materials in all forms, then Congress must give
way and do the hard work of developing measures as close to fail-safe
as possible. That likely means deemphasizing scanning and finding
alternative detection methods that fit into the multi-layered system of
protection that now surrounds America.

109 Matthew Rusling, Study Blasts ContainerScanning Process,March

2009,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/March/Pages/
Study Blasts ContainerScanningProcess.aspx (The study cited was "Measuring
the Operational Impact of Container Inspections at International Ports" by Nitin
Bakshi, Stephen E. Flynn, and Noah Gans.).
110 Jena Baker McNeil, Disaster of 100 Percent Maritime Cargo
Scanning Not Lost on Napolitano, The Heritage Foundation (2009), available

at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecuirty/wm2288.cfm. See also
McNeil, supra note 102.
111 Id. (noting that some Asian and European countries have indicated
it would be a barrier to trade). See also US. to Miss 2012 Nuke Screening

Deadline, supra note 108. (noting that at least 27 countries and major
industrial associations have raised significant concerns about the effect of the
law).
112

US Congress Shifts Away From lOOpc ContainerScreening, Apr.

8, 2009, http://shippingonline.cn/info/msg.asp?id=8894.

